When AI builds itself
Source: Anthropic · 2026-06-04
For most of AI’s history, humans drove every step in its development cycle. But at Anthropic, we are delegating a growing share of AI development to AI systems themselves, which is speeding up our work.
Taken far enough, and given enough compute, that trend points to an AI system capable of fully autonomously designing and developing its own successor. This is called recursive self-improvement. We are not there yet, and recursive self-improvement is not inevitable. But it could come sooner than most institutions are prepared for.
The rate at which AI models improve is accelerating. The length of tasks that they can reliably complete on their own has been doubling roughly every four months, up from an earlier trend of doubling every seven months. In March 2024, Claude Opus 3 could complete software tasks that take humans about four minutes to complete. A year later, Claude Sonnet 3.7 managed tasks that took about an hour and a half. A year after that, Claude Opus 4.6 managed 12-hour tasks.1 If this trend holds, tasks that take a skilled person days could come into range this year. In 2027, AI systems could be capable of tasks that take a person weeks.
Claude writes a significant proportion of Anthropic’s code. As of May 2026, more than 80% of the code we merge into Anthropic’s codebase was authored by Claude.3 Before Claude Code launched in research preview in February 2025, this number was in the low single digits. That shift also shows up in the amount of output per engineer. Lines of code merged per engineer per day stayed constant through Anthropic’s first four years (2021-2024), then began to climb upward in 2025 when Claude began to run code rather than just suggesting it for an engineer to copy and paste. The slope steepened again in 2026 when models began to work autonomously over longer time horizons. These two inflection points are shown in the chart below. In the second quarter of 2026, the typical engineer was merging 8× as much code per day as they were in 2024.4 This is because much of the code is written by Claude, with the engineer directing and reviewing, rather than typing it themselves.
On the most open-ended tasks, Claude’s success rate reached 76% in May 2026, up 50 percentage points in six months. To give an example of tasks in this difficulty tier, a routine upgrade began crashing tens of thousands of training jobs. An engineer pointed Claude at the live incident with little more than some text content and cluster access. Working through the running jobs and testing one environment setting at a time, Claude isolated the single obscure debugging flag that was triggering the crash, reproduced it reliably, and confirmed a fix. In about two hours, Claude delivered what would normally be two to three days of work.
Claude is good at running experiments to hit a goal that someone else has set. Every time Anthropic releases a model, we run the same test: we give Claude some code that trains a small AI model, and ask it to make that code run as fast as possible while still passing the same correctness checks. The goal and the success metrics are fixed in advance, so Claude’s job is to find speedups by rewriting the code, running it, timing it, and repeating. It’s a miniature version of an experimental research loop. In May 2025, Claude Opus 4 averaged a ~3x speedup over the starting code. By April 2026, Claude Mythos Preview was achieving ~52x.
Lines of inquiry this paper opens 24
Research framings built by reading the notes related to this paper — the questions it feeds into.
Can AI research automation sustain progress through accelerating feedback loops?- Are AI companies already implementing slowdowns in development as claimed?
- What acceleration rates in AI development would indicate recursive self-improvement?
- How do AI researchers currently estimate timelines to artificial general intelligence?
- How fast is recursive self-improvement advancing in current AI systems?
- Do diminishing returns prevent recursive self-improvement in AI systems?
- How would recursive self-improvement actually produce information degradation and job loss?
- What specific developmental pathways does recursive self-improvement refer to?
- What distinguishes bounded self-refinement from open-ended recursive self-improvement in AI systems?
- Does autonomous recursive self-improvement require human oversight to remain containable?
- At what point does an AI loop go off the rails during recursive self-improvement?
- Can AI systems improve themselves through recursive self-improvement loops?
- Do bounded self-refinement and open-ended recursion pose different risk profiles?
- Why do frontier labs and academia diverge on recursive improvement risks?
- Does weak exogenous anchoring like compilation checks suffice for safe self-improvement?
- How does recursive self-improvement differ from updating just the policy?
- Why do cybersecurity and self-improvement capability thresholds move at different rates?
- How does OpenAI's Preparedness Framework define AI self-improvement capability?
- What failure modes does recursive self-improvement encounter in evolutionary loops?
- How does bounded self-refinement differ from open-ended recursive self-improvement?
- How do recursive self-improvement and iterative policy improvement differ fundamentally?