Stop treating `AGI' as the north-star goal of AI research
The AI research community plays a vital role in shaping the scientific, engineering, and societal goals of AI research. In this position paper, we argue that focusing on the highly contested topic of ‘artificial general intelligence’ (‘AGI’) undermines our ability to choose effective goals. We identify six key traps—obstacles to productive goal setting—that are aggravated by AGI discourse: Illusion of Consensus, Supercharging Bad Science, Presuming Value-Neutrality, Goal Lottery, Generality Debt, and Normalized Exclusion. To avoid these traps, we argue that the AI research community needs to (1) prioritize specificity in scientific, engineering, and societal goals, (2) center pluralism about multiple worthwhile approaches to multiple valuable goals, and (3) foster innovation through greater inclusion of disciplines and communities. Therefore, the AI research community needs to stop treating “AGI” as the north-star goal of AI research.
Introduction. How can we ensure that AI research goals serve scientific, engineering, and societal needs? What constitutes good science in AI research? Who gets to shape AI research goals? What makes a research goal legitimate or worthwhile? In this position paper, we argue that a widespread emphasis on AGI threatens to undermine the ability of researchers to provide well-motivated answers to these questions. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have sparked interest in “achieving human-level ‘intelligence”’ as a “north-star goal” of the AI field (McCarthy et al., 1955; Morris et al., 2024). This goal is often referred to as “artificial general intelligence” (“AGI”) (Chollet, 2024a; Tibebu, 2025). Yet rather than helping the field converge around shared goals, AGI discourse has mired it in controversies. Researchers diverge on what AGI is and assumptions about goals and risks (Summerfield, 2023; Morris et al., 2024; Blili-Hamelin et al., 2024).
Discussion / Conclusion. Reason 3: Benefiting humans as the goal of technology. If the AI community nevertheless wants an overarching goal to strive towards, the goal should be the support and benefit of human beings. The goals of technology are shaped by people. Evidence-based approaches to examining whether technology effectively meets the needs of people—be they “users”, “consumers”, “patients”, “scholars”, or a myriad of business and social monikers—are well-established. In a quest to achieve AGI, communities often lose sight of the needs of people as a goal, in favor of focusing on just the technology. There is another, more ambitious reason to work towards consensus on supporting and benefiting human beings as a goal. We have noted the role of socially significant disagreements about the goals of technology in our third recommendation of inclusion. Processes ensuring that technology benefits humans have the potential to provide collectively legitimate responses to such disagreements.
Lines of inquiry this paper opens 24
Research framings built by reading the notes related to this paper — the questions it feeds into.
How should designers communicate what AI systems truly are and can do?- What do AI researchers actually mean when they use the term AGI?
- What does Wang mean by intelligence as adaptation with limited resources?
- Can human benefit serve as a shared overarching goal for AI development?
- How do different definitions of intelligence shape AI research priorities?
- Does greater inclusion of disciplines improve AI research goal alignment?
- What constant multiplier scales the veto-holder ratio into absolute welfare cost?
- Do welfare goals and veto-resistance align or pull in opposite directions?
- Can human oversight actually function as a cost on all agent goals?
- Does the veto discount actually outweigh the welfare debit?
- Can additive welfare aggregation justify removing minority override rights?
- Why do welfare goals that sum welfare levels keep the veto gap open?
- How does population size change the apparent cost of capturing veto power?
- Can other objectives in an agent's goal overshadow the veto discount?
- Why does additive aggregation create asymmetry between welfare and veto preservation?
- How does the ratio of veto holders affect the discount's impact?
- Does the veto discount outweigh the welfare preservation cost?
- Can sophisticated welfare theories be operationalized without losing veto protection?
- How does veto-holding differ from welfare-bearing in a population?