Large Language Models Cannot Self-Correct Reasoning Yet

Paper · arXiv 2310.01798 · Published October 3, 2023
Frontier AI Risk & RSI

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as a groundbreaking technology with their unparalleled text generation capabilities across various applications. Nevertheless, concerns persist regarding the accuracy and appropriateness of their generated content. A contemporary methodology, self-correction, has been proposed as a remedy to these issues. Building upon this premise, this paper critically examines the role and efficacy of self-correction within LLMs, shedding light on its true potential and limitations. Central to our investigation is the notion of intrinsic self-correction, whereby an LLM attempts to correct its initial responses based solely on its inherent capabilities, without the crutch of external feedback. In the context of reasoning, our research indicates that LLMs struggle to selfcorrect their responses without external feedback, and at times, their performance even degrades after self-correction. Drawing from these insights, we offer suggestions for future research and practical applications in this field.

Introduction. The rapid advancements in the domain of artificial intelligence have ushered in the era of Large Language Models (LLMs). These models, characterized by their expansive parameter counts and unparalleled capabilities in text generation, have showcased promising results across a multitude of applications (Chowdhery et al., 2023; Anil et al., 2023; OpenAI, 2023, inter alia). However, concerns about their accuracy, reasoning capabilities, and the safety of their generated content have drawn significant attention from the community (Bang et al., 2023; Alkaissi & McFarlane, 2023; Zheng et al., 2023; Shi et al., 2023; Carlini et al., 2021; Huang et al., 2022; Shao et al., 2023; Li et al., 2023; Wei et al., 2023; Zhou et al., 2023b; Zou et al., 2023, inter alia).

Amidst this backdrop, the concept of “self-correction” has emerged as a promising solution, where LLMs refine their responses based on feedback to their previous outputs (Madaan et al., 2023; Welleck et al., 2023; Shinn et al., 2023; Kim et al., 2023; Bai et al., 2022; Ganguli et al., 2023; Gao et al., 2023; Paul et al., 2023; Chen et al., 2023b; Pan et al., 2023, inter alia). However, the underlying mechanics and efficacy of self-correction in LLMs remain underexplored. A fundamental question arises: If an LLM possesses the ability to self-correct, why doesn’t it simply offer the correct answer in its initial attempt? This paper delves deeply into this paradox, critically examining the self-correction capabilities of LLMs, with a particular emphasis on reasoning (Wei et al., 2022; Zhou et al., 2023b; Huang & Chang, 2023).

To study this, we first define the concept of intrinsic self-correction, a scenario wherein the model endeavors to rectify its initial responses based solely on its inherent capabilities, without the crutch of external feedback. Such a setting is crucial because high-quality external feedback is often unavailable in many real-world applications. Moreover, it is vital to understand the intrinsic capabilities of LLMs. Contrary to the optimism surrounding self-correction (Madaan et al., 2023; Kim et al., 2023; Shinn et al., 2023; Pan et al., 2023, inter alia), our findings indicate that LLMs struggle to self-correct their reasoning in this setting. In most instances, the performance after self-correction even deteriorates. This observation is in contrast to prior research such as Kim et al. (2023); Shinn et al. (2023). Upon closer examination, we observe that the improvements in these studies result from using oracle labels to guide the self-correction process, and the improvements vanish when oracle labels are not available.

Besides the reliance on oracle labels, we also identify other issues in the literature regarding measuring the improvement achieved by self-correction. First, we note that self-correction, by design, utilizes multiple LLM responses, thus making it crucial to compare it to baselines with equivalent inference costs. From this perspective, we investigate multi-agent debate (Du et al., 2023; Liang et al., 2023) as a means to improve reasoning, where multiple LLM instances (can be multiple copies of the same LLM) critique each other’s responses. However, our results reveal that its efficacy is no better than self-consistency (Wang et al., 2022) when considering an equivalent number of responses, highlighting the limitations of such an approach.

Another important consideration for self-correction involves prompt design. Specifically, each selfcorrection process involves designing prompts for both the initial response generation and the selfcorrection steps. Our evaluation reveals that the self-correction improvement claimed by some existing work stems from the sub-optimal prompt for generating initial responses, where self-correction corrects these responses with more informative instructions about the initial task in the feedback prompt. In such cases, simply integrating the feedback into the initial instruction can yield better results, and self-correction again decreases performance.

In light of our findings, we provide insights into the nuances of LLMs’ self-correction capabilities and initiate discussions to encourage future research focused on exploring methods that can genuinely correct reasoning.

Related work. With the LLM evolution, the notion of self-correction gained prominence. The discourse on selfcorrection pivots around whether these advanced models can recognize the correctness of their outputs and provide refined answers (Bai et al., 2022; Madaan et al., 2023; Welleck et al., 2023, inter alia). For example, in the context of mathematical reasoning, an LLM might initially solve a complex problem but make an error in one of the calculation steps. In an ideal self-correction scenario, the model is expected to recognize the potential mistake, revisit the problem, correct the error, and consequently produce a more accurate solution.

Yet, the definition of “self-correction” varies across the literature, leading to ambiguity. A pivotal distinction lies in the source of feedback (Pan et al., 2023), which can purely come from the LLM, or can be drawn from external inputs. Internal feedback relies on the model’s inherent knowledge and parameters to reassess its outputs. In contrast, external feedback incorporates inputs from humans, other models (Wang et al., 2023b; Paul et al., 2023, inter alia), or external tools and knowledge sources (Gou et al., 2023; Chen et al., 2023b; Olausson et al., 2023; Gao et al., 2023, inter alia).

In this work, we focus on examining the self-correction capability of LLMs for reasoning. Reasoning is a fundamental aspect of human cognition, enabling us to understand the world, draw inferences, make decisions, and solve problems. To enhance the reasoning performance of LLMs, Kim et al. (2023); Shinn et al. (2023) use oracle labels about the answer correctness to guide the self-correction process. However, in practice, high-quality external feedback such as answer correctness is often unavailable. For effective self-correction, the ability to judge the correctness of an answer is crucial and should ideally be performed by the LLM itself. Consequently, our focus shifts to self-correction without any external or human feedback. We term this setting intrinsic self-correction. For brevity, unless explicitly stated otherwise (e.g., self-correction with oracle feedback), all references to “selfcorrection” in the remainder of this paper pertain to intrinsic self-correction.

Method. In this section, we evaluate existing self-correction methods and compare their performance with and without oracle labels regarding the answer correctness.

Test Models and Setup. We first follow Kim et al. (2023); Shinn et al. (2023) to evaluate the performance of self-correction with oracle labels, using GPT-3.5-Turbo (gpt-3.5-turbo-0613) and GPT-4 accessed on 2023/08/29. For intrinsic self-correction, to provide a more thorough analysis, we also evaluate GPT-4-Turbo (gpt-4-1106-preview) and Llama-2 (Llama-2-70b-chat) (Touvron et al., 2023). For GPT-3.5-Turbo, we employ the full evaluation set. For other models, to reduce the cost, we randomly sample 200 questions for each dataset (100 for HotpotQA) for testing. We prompt the models to undergo a maximum of two rounds of self-correction. We use a temperature of 1 for GPT-3.5-Turbo and GPT-4, and a temperature of 0 for GPT-4-Turbo and Llama-2, to provide evaluation across different decoding algorithms.

Prompts. Following Kim et al. (2023); Shinn et al. (2023), we apply a three-step prompting strategy for self-correction: 1) prompt the model to perform an initial generation (which also serves as the results for Standard Prompting); 2) prompt the model to review its previous generation and produce feedback; 3) prompt the model to answer the original question again with the feedback.

Discussion. Let’s take another look at the results presented in Table 2. These results use ground-truth labels to prevent the model from altering a correct answer to an incorrect one. However, determining how to prevent such mischanges is, in fact, the key to ensuring the success of self-correction.

Intuitive Explanation. If the model is well-aligned and paired with a thoughtfully designed initial prompt, the initial response should already be optimal relative to the prompt and the specific decoding algorithm. Introducing feedback can be viewed as adding an additional prompt, potentially skewing the model towards generating a response that is tailored to this combined input. In an intrinsic self-correction setting, on the reasoning tasks, this supplementary prompt may not offer any extra advantage for answering the question. In fact, it might even bias the model away from producing an optimal response to the initial prompt, resulting in a performance drop.

Another potential approach for LLMs to self-correct their reasoning involves allowing the models to critique and debate through multiple model calls (Du et al., 2023; Liang et al., 2023; Chen et al., 2023a). Du et al. (2023) implement a multi-agent debate method by leveraging multiple instances of a single ChatGPT model and demonstrate significant improvements on reasoning tasks. We adopt their method to test performance on GSM8K. For an unbiased implementation, we use the exact same prompt as Du et al. (2023) and replicate their experiment with the gpt-3.5-turbo-0301 model, incorporating 3 agents and 2 rounds of debate. The only distinction is that, to reduce result variance, we test on the complete test set of GSM8K, compared to their usage of 100 examples. For reference, we also report the results of self-consistency (Wang et al., 2022), which prompts models to generate multiple responses and performs majority voting to select the final answer.

In fact, rather than labeling the multi-agent debate as a form of “debate” or “critique”, it is more appropriate to perceive it as a means to achieve “consistency” across multiple model generations. Fundamentally, its concept mirrors that of self-consistency; the distinction lies in the voting mechanism, whether voting is model-driven or purely based on counts. The observed improvement is evidently not attributed to “self-correction”, but rather to “self-consistency”. If we aim to argue that LLMs can self-correct reasoning through multi-agent debate, it is preferable to exclude the effects of selection among multiple generations.

In Section 3, we observe that although self-correction decreases reasoning performance with all types of feedback prompts we have evaluated, performance varies with different feedback prompts. In this section, we further emphasize the importance of proper prompt design in generating initial LLM responses to fairly measure the performance improvement achieved by self-correction. For example, if a task requires that the model response should meet criteria that can be easily specified in the initial instruction (e.g., the output should contain certain words, the generated code should be efficient, the sentiment should be positive, etc.), instead of including such requirements only in the feedback prompt, an appropriate comparison would be to directly and explicitly incorporate these requirements into the prompt for generating initial responses. Otherwise, when the instruction for generating initial predictions is not informative enough, even if the performance improves, it is unclear whether the improvement merely comes from more detailed instructions in the feedback prompt or from the self-correction step itself.

Conclusion. Our work shows that current LLMs struggle to self-correct their reasoning without external feedback. This implies that expecting these models to inherently recognize and rectify their reasoning mistakes is overly optimistic so far. In light of these findings, it is imperative for the community to approach the concept of self-correction with a discerning perspective, acknowledging its potential and recognizing its boundaries. By doing so, we can better equip the self-correction technique to address the limitations of LLMs and develop the next generation of LLMs with enhanced capabilities. In the following, we provide insights into scenarios where self-correction shows the potential strengths and offer guidelines on the experimental design of future self-correction techniques to ensure a fair comparison.

Leveraging external feedback for correction. In this work, we demonstrate that current LLMs cannot improve their reasoning performance through intrinsic self-correction. Therefore, when valid external feedback is available, it is beneficial to leverage it properly to enhance model performance. For example, Chen et al. (2023b) show that LLMs can significantly improve their code generation performance through self-debugging by including code execution results in the feedback prompt to fix issues in the predicted code. In particular, when the problem description clearly specifies the intended code execution behavior, e.g., with unit tests, the code executor serves as the perfect verifier to judge the correctness of predicted programs, while the error messages also provide informative feedback that guides the LLMs to improve their responses. Gou et al. (2023) demonstrate that LLMs can more effectively verify and correct their responses when interacting with various external tools such as search engines and calculators. Cobbe et al. (2021); Lightman et al. (2023); Wang et al. (2023b) train a verifier or a critique model on a high-quality dataset to verify or refine LLM outputs, which can be used to provide feedback for correcting prediction errors.

Limitations. Although we have conducted a comprehensive evaluation spanning a variety of self-correction strategies, prompts, and benchmarks, our work focuses on evaluating reasoning of LLMs. Thus, it is plausible that there exist self-correction strategies that could enhance LLM performance in other domains. For example, prior works have demonstrated the successful usage of self-correction that aligns model responses with specific preferences, such as altering the style of responses or enhancing their safety (Bai et al., 2022; Ganguli et al., 2023; Madaan et al., 2023). A key distinction arises in the capability of LLMs to accurately assess their responses in relation to the given tasks. For example, LLMs can properly evaluate whether a response is inappropriate (Ganguli et al., 2023), but they may struggle to identify errors in their reasoning.

Furthermore, several prior works have already shown that LLM self-correction performance becomes significantly weaker without access to external feedback (Gou et al., 2023; Zhou et al., 2023a) and can be easily biased by misleading feedback (Wang et al., 2023a), which is consistent with our findings in this work. However, we still identified prevailing ambiguity in the wider community.

Lines of inquiry this paper opens 24

Research framings built by reading the notes related to this paper — the questions it feeds into.

Why does self-revision amplify confidence in wrong model answers? How do models learn from self-generated outputs without cascading failures? How can evaluations be made robust against model reward hacking? How do users confuse explanation quality with actual system accuracy? What prevents LLMs from applying their reasoning knowledge to improve outputs? How can we detect and account for LLM involvement in academic writing? How do hallucinated citations emerge in AI scholarly output? Do language models encode knowledge that influences generation, or primarily imitate surface patterns? How reliably can humans and AI detectors identify machine-generated text? How can we reduce inherent biases in LLM-based evaluation judges? Can LLMs distinguish between linguistic form and semantic meaning?